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Admissibility of Plea Agreements on Direct
Examination: The Limits Vanish
PROFESSOR DANIEL J. CAPRA

James Carlson's Comment on the admissibility of plea agreements
makes a compelling case that the prosecution has virtually unfettered
discretion to admit the plea agreement of a cooperating witness on direct
examination. What began as a relatively uniform limitation on "bolstering" and "impermissible vouching" has been reduced to minimal limitations on only the most outrageous prosecutorial misconduct.
THE DANGER OF ADMITTING PLEA AGREEMENTS

Three concerns are raised when the government introduces a plea
agreement on direct examination of a cooperating witness. The first,
and probably least serious, is that the government is engaged in "bolstering" the credibility of its witness. The general rule is that it is unnecessary to provide information to support a witness' credibility until such
time as that credibility has been attacked. If parties were permitted to
bolster their witnesses, a lot of court time would be spent in introducing
information that might ultimately be unnecessary. If the witness' credibility is never attacked, there is no reason to provide this supporting
evidence because the shared assumption is that witnesses are presumed
credible unless there is reason to think otherwise.' Moreover, a good
deal of otherwise inadmissible information might be introduced in the
guise of supporting credibility, such as prior statements of the witness
that would otherwise be hearsay. Admitting this evidence for "credibility" purposes seems a substantial cost that ought to be avoided, at least
until the opponent attacks that credibility.2
The second concern with admitting plea agreements is that the government may somehow "vouch" for the credibility of the cooperating
1. See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 123 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999): "[Als a general
proposition, bolstering evidence is inadmissible. As of the direct examination, it is uncertain

whether the cross-examiner will attack the witness' credibility; the counsel might waive crossexamination or cross-examine solely for the purpose of eliciting new facts on the merits which
support the counsel's theory of the case. If the opposing counsel does so, all the time devoted to

the bolstering evidence on direct examination will have been wasted. For that reason, the
witness's proponent must ordinarily hold information favorable to the witness's credibility in
reserve for rehabilitation."
2. This is why a prior consistent statement of a witness is not admissible to support
credibility unless the witness credibility has been attacked and the statement is probative in
rebuttal. See generally Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
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witness. It is the jury's job to assess the witness' credibility on the basis
of the testimony and evidence presented. It therefore would be improper
for the government to assert that it knew the witness was telling the
truth, possibly on the basis of extrinsic information not admitted at trial.
As applied to plea agreements, the vouching problem could arise where
there is something in the agreement indicating the government's belief
that the witness is telling the truth. An example, is a clause in the agreement stating that the government had independently verified the truth of
the witness' account. Alternatively, there could be a clause in the agreement that the government could emphasize at trial as demonstrable evidence that the witness had to be telling the truth. An example is a clause
providing that the witness has agreed to submit to a polygraph examination as part of the deal.
The third and most substantial concern with introducing plea agreements of cooperating witnesses, is that the jury will misuse the agreement as evidence of the defendant's guilt. At least this is so where the
witness pleads guilty to committing a crime that is tied in some way to
the defendant. The classic case is where the defendant is charged with
conspiracy and the witness has pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy.
3
As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Toner:
From the common sense point of view[,] a plea of guilty by an
alleged fellow conspirator is highly relevant upon the question of the
guilt of another alleged conspirator. If A's admission that he conspired with B is believed, it is pretty hard to avoid the conclusion that
B must have conspired with A. This is one of the cases, therefore,
where evidence logically probative is to be excluded because of some
countervailing policy. The foundation of the countervailing policy is
the right of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof of the
charge made against him, not against somebody else. Acquittal of an
alleged fellow conspirator is not evidence for a man being tried for
conspiracy. So, likewise, conviction of an alleged fellow conspirator
after a trial is not admissible as against one now being charged. The
defendant had a right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the
evidence presented against him, not by what has happened with
regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else.4
RESPONSE FROM THE COURTS

Mr. Carlson's well-researched Comment shows that the courts have
generally downplayed the three concerns set forth above, to the point
where plea agreements are almost always admissible on direct examina3. 173 F.2d 140 (3rd Cir. 1949).
4. Id. at 142.
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tion. The three dangers from admitting plea agreements on direct examination are generally dismissed by the courts, as follows:
1. The concern over bolstering: Courts have answered that the government has the right to anticipate that defense counsel will bring up the
plea agreement in an attempt to show that the cooperating witness has a
motive to falsify. The courts conclude that the agreement therefore can
be brought out on direct examination to "remove the sting" from the
anticipated impeachment and to prevent the jury from thinking that the
government was hiding negative evidence.
2. The concern over vouching: Courts have held that the government does not vouch for its witnesses simply by introducing their plea
agreements. Rather, vouching is a concern only in those unusual cases
in which the agreement includes government attestations that the witness
has told the truth or that the witness has agreed to take a polygraph
examination.5
3. The concern over misuse of the plea agreement as evidence of
the defendant's guilt: The courts have generally held that plea agreements are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 despite their
prejudicial effect. Courts reason that the prejudicial effect of the plea
agreement can be diminished somewhat by an instruction to the jury
directing it to use the evidence only for proper purposes. Courts usually
find that this prejudicial impact, as diminished by the instruction, does
not substantially outweigh the probative value of the plea agreement for
such purposes as assessing the witness' credibility.
Mr. Carlson seems to conclude that free admissibility of a plea
agreement on direct examination is an inappropriate result. It seems to
me, however, that where the defendant is going to introduce the agree5. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 252 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating the
government should avoid "unnecessarily repetitive references to truthfulness" in the agreement);

United States v. Blinker, 795 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding clause in agreement attesting to
government's independent verification was improperly admitted because it amounted to
government vouching for the credibility of the witness); United States v. Brown, 720 F.2d 1059
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding prosecutor improperly referred to the fact that as part of plea bargain
agreements several government witnesses agreed to submit to polygraph tests); United States v.
Hilton, 772 F.2d 783 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding it was error to permit the government to introduce

plea bargain documents containing references to polygraph examinations and to argue that its
witnesses were credible because they agreed to take such examinations). Clauses in the agreement
under which the witness agrees to testify truthfully are, by contrast, admissible, so long as the
prosecutor does not improperly rely on such a clause to specifically argue that the witness must
have been telling the truth. Truth telling clauses are considered to add nothing to the witness'

already-existing obligation to tell the truth. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.2d 401 (6th
Cir. 2000) (holding no abuse of discretion in the admission of a cooperating witness plea
agreement that contained a promise to provide truthful information; introduction of the entire
agreement permitted the jury to consider fully the witness possible conflicting motivations, and
the prosecutor did not improperly rely on the truthfulness provision in closing argument to vouch
for the witness).
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ment on cross-examination in an attempt to show that the witness is
lying in order to get a deal, it is only fair to permit the government to
bring out the agreement on direct. The government should be able to
blunt the impact of an anticipated attack; otherwise, the impeachment
evidence will look much more important than it really is.6 More importantly, if the government cannot refer to the plea agreement on direct, it
will suffer a negative consequence when the agreement is raised on
cross-examination. The jury may think that the government was trying
to hide the fact that a deal was made with the witness. This would be an
unfair inference if the agreement was barred from direct by an evidence
rule rather than by the government's own decision. Moreover, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 607, the prosecution has the right to impeach a
witness it calls. To the extent a plea agreement impeaches a witness for
bias, the prosecution would much rather conduct that impeachment in a
relatively gentle manner on direct examination-leaving defense counsel to seem overreactive if she then emphasizes the agreement on crossexamination. So where the defendant is going to raise the agreement on
cross-examination, the agreement carries substantial probative value for
the government's case. As a general rule, this probative value is probably not substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury will use the
agreement as evidence of the defendant's guilt even though instructed
not to do so.7 Therefore, in this kind of case, the plea agreement ordinarily should be admissible on direct examination of the cooperating
witness.
The situation arguably changes, however, if the defendant promises
not to refer to the agreement on cross-examination or elsewhere in the
trial. Why should the plea agreement be admitted to remove the sting of
a cross-examination that the defendant promises will never occur? The
recent en banc consideration by the Third Circuit in United States v.
Universal RehabilitationServices (PA), Inc.,8 provides a good overview
and a marvelous discussion of both sides of the issue. The defendants
were tried for mail fraud and related offenses. Two cooperating witnesses testified and on direct examination their guilty pleas and plea
agreements were offered into evidence. The agreements apparently contained no vouching or polygraph clauses. But the defendants objected
6. The rule that a party may "remove the sting" of anticipated cross-examination and
impeachment is not solely for the benefit of prosecutors. Defense counsel and counsel in civil

cases often find it advisable to refer in direct examination to the prior convictions of their
witnesses. See generally Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
7. See FED. R. Evio. 403 (providing that relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury).

8. 205 F.3d 657 (3rd Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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nonetheless. The defendants recognized that plea agreements are routinely admitted on direct to allow the prosecution to "remove the sting"
of an anticipated attack by the defendant on the witness' motive to falsify. The defendants did not deny this as a proper purpose;9 nor could
they. o
The defendants in Universal argued instead that the rationale for
admitting plea agreements on direct is premised on the assumption that
defense counsel will in fact raise the agreement on cross-examination
and attack the cooperating witness for bias. To head off the prosecution's legitimate concern that the agreements would be raised on crossexamination, the defendants proffered a concession. They promised that
at trial they "will not raise the guilty plea/plea agreements on cross
examination nor seek to raise any inference on which the accomplices'
pleas of guilty would be admissible to rebut."'" The defendants argued
that this proffered concession meant that there was no longer any need to
bring out the plea agreements on direct examination. They asserted that
their concession robbed the plea agreements of any probative value, so
that admitting the agreements would be an abuse of discretion under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.12

The trial court in Universal was unpersuaded by the defendants'
argument. It reasoned that the agreements were still probative, despite
the defendants' proffered concession, because if they were not introduced "the jury is going to wonder whether or not [the witnesses] have
been charged. It's going to wonder perhaps what they have been promised by the prosecutor if anything and what they may be getting in return
for their testimony."' 3 This risk of jury speculation would not be ameliorated by the defendants' promise not to bring up the plea agreements.
The risk of prejudice in admitting a plea agreement is, of course,
that the jury will impermissibly use it as substantive evidence that the
defendant is guilty. The trial judge in Universal weighed this risk
against the probative value of the agreements, considered the effect of a
limiting instruction in diminishing the prejudicial effect, and decided
that the agreements could be admitted on direct examination of each
witness. The jury was instructed not to use the agreements as evidence
of the defendants' guilt.' 4 The defendants were convicted of a single
count of mail fraud. Notably, they had been charged with a number of
counts and acquitted of all but one. The defendants were convicted of
9. Universal, 205 F.3d at 662-63.

10. See id. at 665.
11. Id. at 672 n.3.
12. See id. at 662-63.
13. Id. at 662.
14. Id.
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the very count to which the cooperating witnesses had pleaded guilty.' 5
What a coincidence!
On appeal, the basic question was whether the trial court abused its
discretion under Rule 403 when it admitted the plea agreements even
though the defendants agreed not to bring them up at the trial. The
majority of the en banc court found no abuse of discretion. It argued
that the plea agreements were probative on three points, even after the
defendants agreed not to raise them. Specifically, the plea agreements
were probative: "(1) to allow the jury accurately to assess the credibility
of the witness; (2) to eliminate any concern that the jury may harbor
concerning whether the government has selectively prosecuted the
defendant; and (3) to explain how the witness has first-hand knowledge
concerning the events about which he/she is testifying." 6
The defendants responded that it was unnecessary to provide proof
of the witnesses' credibility because the defendants by their concession
agreed not to attack the witnesses' credibility. But this was not sufficient for the majority. The majority noted that jurors are instructed that
they are to determine the credibility of all witnesses who testify, and this
is so even if the witness' credibility is not attacked.' 7 Therefore, credibility remained a live issue even after the defendants' concession.
This argument is problematic because while credibility remains a
live issue, the admission of the plea agreement in the absence of an
attack will actually harm the credibility of the prosecution witness;
meaning that the prosecution should not be able to argue that it needs to
admit the agreement to prove the witness' credibility. The agreement
will raise an inference that the witness has a motive to falsify in order to
get his deal-an inference that would not otherwise have been raised.
The majority's argument essentially permits the prosecutor to offer the
plea agreements for the impermissible purpose of proving the defendant
guilty, because no rational prosecutor would offer evidence of credibility
when that evidence impeaches her own witness' credibility in the
absence of any anticipated attack.
The defendants responded to the majority's argument that credibility could not be taken out of the case by citing Old Chief v. United
States.'8 In Old Chief, the Court found an abuse of discretion under
Rule 403 when the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant's prior
felony conviction even though the defendant offered to stipulate that he
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 665-66.
519 U.S. 172 (1997).
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had been convicted of a felony. 9 The conviction was admitted as proof
of the defendant's status as a felon, an element of the felon-firearmpossession crime with which he was charged. The Old Chief Court held
that the government was required to accept the proffered stipulation
because its probative value was equal to that of the conviction itself, i.e.,
the stipulation was determinative proof of the felony status element of
the crime charged. The trial court erred in admitting the prejudicial conviction when there was equally probative and less prejudicial evidence
available to prove the status element of the crime.2"
The majority in Universal distinguished Old Chief as a case where
the proffered stipulation "was of equal probative value to the government's proffered evidence."'" This was not the case with the defendants' offer to refrain from bringing up the plea agreements of the
cooperating witnesses. Essentially the defendants' concession meant, in
the best of circumstances, that any motive the witnesses would have to
lie in order to get a deal with the government would not be considered
by the jury. But the plea agreements were probative for other purposes
beyond explaining bias. Specifically, the plea agreements were probative
to (1) counteract the possibility that the jury might believe that the
defendants were being selectively prosecuted instead of the equally culpable witnesses, and (2) explain how the witnesses had first hand knowledge concerning the matters to which they were testifying.22
Because the plea agreements in Universal retained probative value
despite the defendants' concession, the remaining question was whether
the trial court properly balanced that probative value with the risk of
prejudicial effect. The majority argued that the prejudicial effect in this
case was diminished by the fact that the jury was instructed a number of
times not to use the plea agreements as substantive evidence of the
defendants' guilt. These instructions minimized the risk that the jury
would use the agreements impermissibly.23
The majority emphasized that the court of appeals can reverse a
district court's Rule 403 decision only if there was an abuse of discretion. The question is not whether the trial court misbalanced the factors
of probative value and prejudicial effect. The question is whether no
reasonable jurist, balancing these factors, would have admitted the plea
agreements. Under this deferential standard of review, the majority had
little difficulty in affirming the trial court. As the majority stated, the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 186.
Universal, 205 F.3d at 666.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 668-69.
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trial court had not acted "arbitrarily or irrationally-and therefore did
not abuse its discretion" under Rule 403.24
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH DEFENSE CONCESSIONS

Before we get to the dissents in Universal, it might be appropriate
to consider another potential (though unexpressed) concern of the Universal majority. The defendants' proffered concession was that they
would not "raise the guilty plea/plea agreements on cross examination
nor seek to raise any inference on which the accomplices' pleas of guilty
would be admissible to rebut. ' 25 This stipulation is not exactly crystalclear. By way of contrast, Old Chief's proffered stipulation left no
ambiguity. He offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a felony, which was the precise element of the crime with which he was
charged.26 Now consider the defendants' promise in Universal not to
"raise" the plea agreement. What does "raise" mean? Does it mean that
the defendants will make no specific reference to the guilty pleas? What
if defense counsel asks the witness "have you ever spoken with a government agent before testifying today?' The prosecution would howl
that this is an indirect reference that "raises" the plea agreement. But
defense counsel might respond that he was not referring to the agreement at all-he was just inquiring into whether anyone in the government had helped the witness prepare his trial testimony. What does the
court do then?
Other questions arise about the stipulation procedure in practice.
What if the defense counsel simply accuses the witness of being a liar?
Does this "raise" the plea agreement? What if counsel charges the witness with being the person who duped the defendant to commit the
crime that the witness himself benefitted from? Indeed, where the witness is obviously involved with the same activity as the defendant, what
kind of cross-examination would not raise an inference that could be
rebutted by the plea agreement?
The above questions raise a legitimate concern that the defendants'
proffered concession in Universal was too vague and slippery to be
enforceable-or at least raise the possibility that a court might be wary
before holding that the defendants' promise rendered alternative evidence inadmissible. Under these circumstances, the government is justifiably concerned that the defense is impinging on the prosecution's
ability to present its evidence in the most meaningful and compelling
way. As the Supreme Court noted in Old Chief,the proponent ordinarily
24. Id. at 669.
25. Id. at 672.
26. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 175 (1997).
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has the right to present its case in the way it sees fit, subject to the
Federal Rules of Evidence; attempts by the adversary to control the
proof by way of stipulation are not favored.2 7
There is another practical problem with the defendants' proffered
concession in Universal. Assume it can be determined that the defendants violated the concession by either raising the agreements or raising
an inference that the agreements can rebut. What happens then? Presumably the prosecution would then get to introduce the agreements.
But by then it might be too late to help the prosecution very much. To
take a simple example, assume the prosecution is not permitted to elicit
the agreements on direct, and defense counsel on cross-examination
accuses the defendant of being a government snitch, only out for what
he can get from the government. The prosecution would then, presumably, get to introduce the plea agreement on re-direct. However, that is
obviously an insufficient protection of the government interest that is
protected when the agreement is brought out on direct.
The prosecution wants to introduce the agreement on direct in order
to remove the sting of anticipated impeachment and prevent the jury
from thinking that the prosecution is hiding negative evidence. These
legitimate prosecutorial objectives are not protected by the ability to
introduce the agreements on redirect after defense counsel violates the
stipulation. The damage at that point has been done. Perhaps some of
the damage can be alleviated by a limiting instruction, in which the trial
judge tells the jury that it is not to draw a negative inference from the
fact that the prosecutor brought out the agreements on re-direct rather
than on direct examination. But this instruction, even if effective, cannot restore the prosecution's interest in removing the sting of anticipated
impeachment by bringing out the agreements gently and lovingly on
direct examination.
An even more serious practical problem exists if defense counsel
attacks the motives of the cooperating witnesses in closing argument.
Now what is the court to do? Must it allow the government to reopen its
case to introduce proof of the agreements? That remedy will not satisfy
the prosecution because reopening will look like a desperate ploy by the
government. The government will look like it has a lack of confidence
in the strength of the evidence it has already presented. Again, a limiting instruction might diminish some of the prejudice suffered by the
government if it were to reopen its case; the jury could be instructed not
to draw a negative inference about the strength of the government's case
27. See id. at 186. For more discussion on Old Chief, see my response to Ms. Hervic's
Comment. Daniel J. Capra, Out-of-Court Accusations Offered For "Background": A Measured
Response From the Federal Courts, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803 (2001).
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or the timing of its presentation of the agreement. But the possibility of
having to reopen the case after defense counsel violates its proffered
concession might well give a court pause before holding that the defendant, by proffering such a concession, can prevent the government from
bringing out a plea agreement on direct.
Perhaps the real answer to the problems that might arise if defense
counsel violates the terms of the concession is this: If the trial judge
agrees to exclude the agreement conditioned on defense counsel complying with its promise not to raise the agreement, defense counsel is
very unlikely to violate that promise. If the defense counsel raises the
plea agreements after agreeing not to do so, she certainly risks sanctions
from the court. She also risks a court holding that the entirety of the
plea agreement is admissible, including provisions that defense counsel
would rather not have the jury hear about. And finally, if courts were to
hold that defendants could keep plea agreements out of the case by
agreeing not to raise them, and then defendants continually reneged on
their promises and raised the agreements anyway, courts would no
longer permit the practice. Defendants would be back to facing the
admission of the entire plea agreement on direct examination without
any ability to control the risk of prejudice by promising not to mention
the agreement on cross.
Perhaps any concern over the costs of the "defense concession"
approach is overstated. Even so, the concern is not negligible, and the
Universal majority may have thought that a rule allowing defendants to
control the proof of plea agreements would be fraught with difficulty.
A

MORE CAREFUL BALANCE OF INTERESTS

All that said, there is significant power in the argument that where
the defendant concedes that he will not bring up the plea agreement, it
should fall out of the case unless the defendant reneges on that concession. The majority in Universal argued that the concession was not
"equally probative" to the agreement itself, because the agreement was
still probative to answer jury speculation about selective prosecution,
and to explain how the cooperating witnesses had personal knowledge of
the matters to which they were testifying.2 8 But even if this is so, it does
not mean that admitting the agreement satisfies Rule 403.
The analysis of both the trial court and the majority in Universal
basically ends by stating that the proffered concession and the plea
agreements are not "equally probative"' 9 and therefore the agreements
28. Universal, 205 F.3d at 667.
29. Id. (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191).
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can still be admitted under Rule 403. 3 0 However, this is not a very careful Rule 403 analysis, and it ignores the fundamental teaching of Old
Chief As Chief Judge Becker states in his dissent in Universal, Old
Chief stands for the proposition that under Rule 403, "proffered evidence must not be analyzed as an island unto itself."'" Rather, admissibility of a piece of evidence under Rule 403 can only be evaluated in
comparison with other available means of proof on the same point. The
reason the Court reversed Old Chief's conviction for felon firearm possession was that his proffered stipulation of a felony conviction was just
as probative, and not nearly as prejudicial, as actual proof of the conviction itself. Put another way, the probative value of the felony conviction
was diminished by the availability of other proof of the defendant's felony status (i.e., the stipulation). In contrast, the prejudicial effect of the
conviction remained constant; the jury would use the nature of the specific conviction as proof that Old Chief was a bad person with a propensity to commit a certain kind of crime. This risk of prejudice had to be
balanced against the diminished probative value of the felony conviction
in light of the alternative evidence. So, it was not surprising that the Old
Chief Court concluded that the prejudice resulting from admission of the
conviction substantially outweighed its probative value.3 2
Applying this more nuanced Old Chief analysis to the facts of Universal, it is apparent that the Rule 403 inquiry cannot simply end when
the court finds that the plea agreements remain probative even after the
defendants' promise not to raise them. The question is whether the
diminished probative value, in light of the concession, is substantially
outweighed by the obvious risk that the jury will use the plea agreements
as proof that the defendants are guilty. As Judge Roth states in his dissent in Universal, the evaluation of the probative value of the plea agreements "cannot be made without a consideration of the defendants'
commitment" not to raise the agreements.3 3
If such a balance of diminished probative value were to be conducted, should the trial court have permitted the plea agreements to be
introduced despite the defendants' commitment not to raise them?
According to the majority, the agreements remained probative (1) to
allay any jury concerns that the defendants had been selectively prosecuted, and (2) to establish that the witnesses had personal knowledge of
the events to which they were testifying.3 4 What is the probative
strength of the agreements for these purposes?
30. See id. at 669.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 683.
Old Chief,519 U.S. at 191.
Universal, 205 F.3d at 676.
Id. at 665.
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As to selective prosecution, evidence of the plea agreements seems
at first blush to be very probative. The cooperating witnesses in Universal were relatively major players in the charged scheme. The jury may
well have wondered why the defendants were being prosecuted and
these witnesses were not. Evidence of the plea agreements would
explain the situation and diminish any such speculation. The jury would
see that the defendants were not being singled out because the witnesses
were charged as well. It is true that the defendants were not, making a
selective prosecution argument. But the government has a legitimate
concern that the jury may speculate about prosecutorial selectivity even
if the argument is not raised, given the fact that similarly situated people
are seemingly being treated quite differently.
Yet this does not end the inquiry. If the government is concerned
about jury speculation, why not just ask the court to instruct the jury that
it should not speculate about selective prosecution? Why resort to introducing evidence that is prejudicial to the defendant, in order to allay a
concern over jury speculation that, while legitimate, may not in fact
arise? Judge Roth, dissenting in Universal, makes the compelling argument that the best way to avoid jury speculation is "to instruct the jury
members that they should concern themselves only with the guilt or
innocence of defendants and not with the possibility of selective prosecution or the involvement of any other persons in any alleged scheme." 3 5
Again, the possibility of less prejudicial alternatives-in this case a limiting instruction-did not receive proper consideration by the Universal
majority.
Indeed, there is a good argument that the use of an instruction is a
more efficient way to deal with jury speculation than is introducing the
prejudicial plea agreement. Under the prosecution's scenario, evidence
must be presented to eliminate the risk of jury speculation. But this
evidence carries with it prejudicial effect, so the jury is instructed that it
cannot use the plea agreements as evidence of guilt. In other words, to
allay the risk of jury speculation, the prosecution proposes admission of
evidence and a limiting instruction to prevent jury speculation on a different subject. Under the defendants' view, the risk of jury speculation
is handled by a cautionary instruction without the need to introduce any
evidence. As Chief Judge Becker notes in his dissent in Universal, the
defendants' suggested mode of presentation "takes less time and is more
direct." 36 Certainly, this greater efficiency is a consideration that must
be taken into account when balancing the probative value of evidence
against the risks of prejudice, confusion and delay under Rule 403.
35. Id. at 682.

36. Id. at 685.
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What about the probative value of the plea agreement in establishing that the witnesses had personal knowledge about the matters to
which they testified? It seems obvious that the probative value for this
purpose is minimal. The plea agreement proves nothing more about the
witnesses' personal knowledge than their in-court testimony already
shows. Judge Roth, in his dissent in Universal, points up the flaw in the
argument that a plea agreement is probative of the witness' personal
knowledge:
I am left wondering . . . how the introduction of a witness's
guilty plea into evidence establishes the basis for his or her firsthand
knowledge of the crime. Presumably, all that the introduction of the
guilty plea establishes is that the witness pleaded guilty. It is the witness's testimony itself that establishes the basis for his or her firsthand knowledge of the crime-the witness has firsthand knowledge
because s/he was present during or participated in the crime, not
because s/he pleaded guilty to the crime.37
Admitting the plea agreement to prove the witness' personal knowledge
amounts to impermissible bolstering. The witness has stated on the
stand that she witnessed the crime. In the absence of an attack on that
assertion (e.g., cross-examination asserting that the witness wasn't really
there) there is no reason to introduce the plea agreement. It is simply
cumulative on the question of personal knowledge.
THE SUM OF THE RULE

403

BALANCING

So how should the Rule 403 balancing have come out in Universal,
where the defendants concede that they will not raise the plea agreement
on cross-examination?
On the probative value side is the following:
1. The probative value in removing the sting of anticipated
impeachment and preventing the implication that the government is
hiding evidence appears, at first glance, to be zero, given the defendants' proffered concession. But, it would seem appropriate to give
some consideration to the possibility that the concession might be
vague and hard to enforce, and would result in practical problems if
violated. These are not specifically considerations of "probative
value," but they are relevant considerations for the court in determining whether the defendants' concession is indeed an adequate alternative to proof of the agreements. The less adequate the concession
alternative, the more probative are the plea agreements.
2. The probative value in preventing the jury from speculating
about selective prosecution seems fairly high at first glance, but it is
37. Id. at 672.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:751

significantly minimized by the alternative possibility of an instruction
to the jury forbidding such speculation.
3. The probative value in proving the witnesses' personal
knowledge is essentially zero in the absence of an attack on this
point.
Considering the cumulative effect of the probative value of the
plea agreements on all of these points and in light of the defendants'
concession, one could only say that the probative value is not overwhelming. On a probative value scale of one to hundred, I would
give it about a twenty, only because the defendants' promise not to
raise the agreement is not a perfect alternative in all circumstances.
On the prejudicial effect side is the following:
1. The risk that the jury will use the plea agreements as evidence of the defendants' guilt seems, at first glance, to be quite powerful. The prejudice is especially high because one of the counts
charged against the defendants was precisely the crime to which the
cooperating witnesses pled guilty. On the other hand, under Rule 403
the prejudicial effect that is considered is that remaining after a limiting instruction is given.3 8 In Universal, the trial court instructed the
jury on three occasions that it was not to consider the agreements as
evidence of the defendants' guilt. One might argue in response that
the jury convicted the defendants on only one count-the count to
which the witnesses pled guilty. So it seems apparent that the
instructions had little effect. The effect of a limiting instruction in
minimizing prejudice, however, should be assessed as of the time the
instruction is given, and not in light of the verdict rendered. So, it is
fair to state that the risk of prejudice resulting from the admission of
the plea agreements is substantial, but somewhat reduced by the
instructions to the jury. On a prejudicial effect scale from one to a
hundred, I would give it about a fifty.
In balancing the above factors, it must be remembered that the evidence is excluded only if the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs
the probative value. This is where judgment calls are made and reasonable minds often differ. I can say that if I were the trial judge in Universal, I would not have permitted the prosecution to introduce the plea
agreements after the defendants promised not to raise them at trial. I
would have made the defendants aware that their concession would be
fully enforced-no funny stuff. I would have instructed the jury, upon
the government's request, that it was not to concern itself with how the
government chose to try the defendants before them as compared to
other possible perpetrators, but was only to concern itself with the guilt
38. See
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or innocence of the defendants before the court. I believe that in light of
the alternatives available-i.e., concession from the defendants and limiting instruction to diminish the risk of jury speculation on selective
prosecution-the remaining probative value of the plea agreements was
substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the defendants.
I am hard-pressed to say, however, that the trial court in Universal
abused its discretion, that is to say acted irrationally, in coming out the
other way. There is some residual probative value in the agreements,
even after the defendants' concession and a limiting instruction. And
limiting instructions can diminish the prejudicial effect of the agreements. Given the role of appellate judges in reviewing Rule 403 determinations, the majority's viewpoint in Universal is understandable.
After all, the trial court did explicitly balance the Rule 403 factors, and it
was the trial court who saw the witnesses and heard the proffered concession. It is hard to reverse that decision on a cold record.
That being said, the fundamental problem with affirming the trial
court in Universal, is that it means that plea agreements will always be
admissible on direct examination. The Universal facts present the
strongest facts possible for exclusion of the plea agreements. The best
reasons for admitting the agreements on direct are to remove the sting of
anticipated impeachment and to counter the implication that the prosecution is hiding negative evidence. Where these risks are virtually eliminated by the defendants' promise not to raise the agreements, and yet the
trial court still holds that the agreements are admissible under Rule 403,
it is apparent that plea agreements will be admissible in every case and
there is nothing that the defendant can do to keep them out. The only
prohibitions remaining are that (1) vouching clauses in the agreements
will have to be struck, and (2) the prosecution will not be able to argue
that the witnesses must be telling the truth because they entered into
these agreements. But these limits are left for unusual and extreme
cases.
Because affirming the trial court in Universal means that plea
agreements are essentially automatically admissible, the Court of
Appeals should have stepped in and found an abuse of discretion. While
the abuse of discretion standard is deferential, it should not mean that
trial court decisions admitting prejudicial evidence are impervious to
review, no matter the circumstances. As Judge Sloviter stated in her
dissent in Universal:
The majority's holding that a guilty plea is admissible to permit
the jury to assess the credibility of the witness, even in the absence of
an attack on the witness's credibility, or to dispel jury concern about
selective prosecution, even if the defendant has not so contended,
transmutes a case-by-case analysis under Fed.R.Evid. 403 into a gen-
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eral rule of admissibility. I see no justification for such a rule.39
It is troubling that the Universal court essentially ceded its reviewing
authority over the admissibility of plea agreements on direct examination. Given the defendants' promise not to refer to the agreements, Universal presented the best case for imposing some minimal limitation that
would protect defendants from what everyone agrees is prejudicial
information.
It does not follow, however, that the decision in Universal means
that plea agreements of cooperating witnesses will be automatically
admitted in all trials, no matter what the defendant does. The court in
Universal did indeed abdicate its authority to review trial court decisions
admitting plea agreements. But it did not hold that trial courts must
admit these agreements. It simply held that the trial court did not abuse
its wide discretion in admitting the plea agreements."0 It is very likely
that if the court had reviewed the trial court's decision to exclude the
agreements, its review would have been similarly deferential. The court
would undoubtedly have found that the trial court did not abuse its wide
discretion in excluding the plea agreements, given their limited probative value and high prejudicial effect.
So it is to be hoped that trial courts will use their discretion to
exclude plea agreements from jury consideration when the defendant
makes a solid, clear commitment that he will not raise: (1) the plea or
plea agreement; (2) any attack on the witness' motive to falsify that
might arise from an interest in cooperation or cutting a deal; or (3) any
inference that the defendant was selectively prosecuted. If the trial court
does the right thing and excludes the plea agreement when such a clear
promise is made, it should instruct the jurors upon request that they
should concern themselves only with the guilt or innocence of the
defendants and not with the possibility of selective prosecution or the
involvement of the witnesses in the crimes charged.
WHAT ABOUT RULE

608?

As Mr. Carlson points out, several courts have held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 608 imposes limitations on the prosecution's use of
plea agreements on direct examination. The dissenters in Universal
made a half-hearted attempt to argue that the trial court's decision to
admit the witnesses' plea agreements violated Rule 608. For example,
Judge Roth stated: "Arguably, under Rule 608(a), absent an attack on
[the cooperating witnesses'] credibility, their guilty pleas are
39. Universal, 205 F.3d at 686-87.
40. Id. at 669.
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inadmissible.'
This argument is not borne out by the language of Rule 608(a)
however. Rule 608(a) states that the credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported "by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation"
but subject to the limitation that "evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." 42 By its
terms, Rule 608(a) limits only the forms of proof of a witness' credibility. It imposes limits on opinion or reputation evidence of credibility. A
plea agreement, however, is neither opinion nor reputation evidence.
Therefore, Rule 608(a) does not apply.
What about Rule 608(b)? That Rule provides as follows:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purposes of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility .... may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. .. 43
In Universal, Judge Roth argued that in admitting the plea agreements
on direct examination, the trial court acted "at odds with Rule 608(b)."
But this argument is weak. For one thing, it is not clear that a plea
agreement is "conduct" of a witness within the meaning of the Rule. For
another, the Rule simply states that certain evidence pertinent to credibility may not be proved by "extrinsic evidence." The Rule itself
imposes no limitation on referring to or testifying to evidence of credibility on direct examination. It simply provides that the information
covered by the Rule cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. Thus, at
most, Rule 608(b) would prohibit introduction of the plea agreement
itself into evidence; it does not prohibit the prosecutor from asking the
witness about the agreement or eliciting testimony about the terms of the
agreement and the witness' understanding of it, etc.
But most importantly, Rule 608(b) applies only when the evidence
is offered to attack or support the witness' characterfor truthfulness.
The Rule does not apply to evidence offered to prove other aspects of
the witness' credibility, such as bias/motive to falsify, inconsistent statements, contradiction, and capacity. The United States Supreme Court
made this clear in United States v. Abel where the Court held that extrinsic evidence of a witness' motive to falsify could be admitted subject to
Rule 403. 4" The exclusionary language of Rule 608(b) was held inappli41. Id. at 680.
42. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
43. FED. R. Ev1D. 608(b).
44. Universal, 205 F.3d at 680.
45. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:751

cable because it applied only when the sole purpose of admitting the

extrinsic evidence is to prove the witness' character for veracity.4 6 A
plea agreement of a cooperating witness is not offered to prove the witness' character for truthtelling. Entering into a plea agreement is no
indication of whether the witness is generally a liar. Rather, the plea

agreement is offered to prove that the witness has a motive to lie about
the defendant's involvement in order to preserve his deal with the government. This is evidence of bias. Under Abel, it is therefore not covered by Rule 608(b).47

In sum, Rule 608 provides no authority for the trial court to exclude
the plea agreement of a cooperating witness. Whatever protection exists
for defendants must come from Rule 403.48
CONCLUSION

Mr. Carlson's Comment paints a bleak landscape for defendants
when the government presents the testimony of a cooperating witness.
The result is that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, the jury will
get to hear that the witness has pleaded guilty to the same crime with
which the defendant is charged, and it will also be informed of the terms
46. Id. at 56; see also United States v. Grover, 85 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to attack a witness' character for veracity, but it is admissible for
impeachment by way of contradiction, subject to Rule 403); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d
1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996) (where the defendant suggested that a witness falsely implicated him to
obtain a plea agreement, the government was properly permitted to prove that the witness
cooperated against a number of people; such evidence tended to rebut the suggestion that the
testimony was a lie he told in his own self-interest: "The admissibility of evidence regarding a
witness's bias, diminished capacity, and contradictions in his testimony is not specifically
addressed by the Rules and thus admissibility is limited only by the relevance standard of Rule
402. Therefore, because the attack at issue was on Burns' bias, and not on his character for
truthfulness in general, Lindenmann's contention that the limitations of Rule 608 should have
applied is incorrect. Moreover, because bias is not a collateral issue, it was permissible for
evidence on this issue to be extrinsic in form").
47. Admittedly, Rule 608(b) appears broader than the Court construed it in Abel. It states that
extrinsic evidence is prohibited when offered to support or attack the witness' "credibility."
Credibility is a broader term than "character for veracity" and could be construed to cover
evidence of bias as well as other types of impeachment evidence. But as indicated in Abel, the
courts construe the Rule 608(b) reference to "credibility" to really mean "character for veracity."
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rule has proposed an amendment to Rule 608(b) that
would substitute the term "character for truthfulness" for the existing term "credibility." This
proposed amendment has been released for public comment. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure 171-174 (Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, August 2001).
48. See generally Edward Imwinkelreid, The Silence Speaks Volumes: A Brief Reflection on
Whether it is Necessary of Even Desirable to Fill the Seeming Gaps in Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1013 (1998) (concluding that for the most part
misapplication of the Article VI rules has occurred because some courts have failed to recognize
that Rule 403 operates as a default provision for impeachment questions that are not specifically
treated in Article VI).

2001]

ADMISSIBILITY OF PLEA AGREEMENTS

769

of the agreement itself. The jury may well assume that because the witness has pleaded guilty, the defendant is guilty as well. The only protection the defendant will receive is a limiting instruction.
It does not have to be this way, however. Trial courts certainly
have the discretion to exclude a plea agreement when the defendant
makes a clear commitment not to raise it at any point in the trial. While a
trial court might be concerned about how such a commitment will be
enforced, there is some comfort in the fact that defense counsel will
have the incentive to live up to her promise; by doing so, she saves
herself from sanctions and the client from substantial prejudice. The
trial court should therefore exercise its discretion to exclude the plea
agreement of a cooperating witness when the defense counsel promises
not to raise it at trial and lives up to that promise.

